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Abstract 
In this master thesis I investigate a question that is and always will be of importance: 
What is it that matters most? On this occasion, the way in which the question is 
presented is: Which of the two rights – to health and intellectual property – should be 
prioritized in situations where the two come into conflict with each other? I seek to 
make clear which interest or right should be considered most important. The question 
is answered by performing a normative analysis of contributions in political 
philosophy by John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Henry Shue. These three thinkers 
represent different theories on how a just society should be governed, which 
principles peoples should live by, and which rights are the most fundamental. The 
conflict of interest that is analyzed is one that arises between human beings in need of 
medical care, and those who invent and manufacture medications, and such hold 
patents on medical developments. In my thesis, I uncover what the three theories 
prescribe with regards to solving this conflict of interest, as well as confront the 
arguments with each other. 
Whilst the theories of Rawls and Shue push towards a prioritization of a right to 
health, the strong regard for property rights in Nozick leads to a different conclusion 
on his end. When the arguments are confronted, all three potentially lead to priority 
being given to promoting a human right to health. However, as can be seen in the 
analysis – this is a truth with certain limitations. A right to intellectual property may 
have further implications for a right to health than that of serving as a hinder. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
In the study of political science, scholarly contributions may take on one out of two 
archetypes of style. They can seek to explain what something is and why; or they can 
investigate how something ought to be. This second approach is referred to as 
normative analysis, and has strong ties to both philosophy and ethics as fields of 
study. 
Within political science we also differentiate between politics and policy. Politics, 
generally speaking, is the construction of an institutional framework suitable to shape 
society and human interaction on different levels given certain interests and goals, 
whilst policy lays out how to go about this in practical terms. The intermediary step 
between these two is the normative evaluation of which interests should be translated 
into action. Rather than explain how something came to be and why, the normative 
researcher bases his or her writing on the well-founded argument and on a moral 
evaluation of the virtue and merit of diverse actions. This approach can be recognized 
by the application of a set of norms to a problem, in order to discover which solution 
to the problem is the right one. 
This thesis will make use of the longstanding normative tradition within political 
science and weigh the right to health against the right to intellectual property. 
Because out of these two, which right matters most? Are these rights a pair that could 
or should be enforced at the same time? And, in situations where the rights come into 
conflict with each other, which right should be given priority? I set out to answer 
questions such as these in this thesis. 
It is my goal to be able to make some assertions as to what some of our times most 
read and well-known political philosophers would answer, presented with these 
questions. It is also my goal to make an assessment as to which of them we should 
lend our ear to, when seeking to go about the practicalities of prioritizing between 
different rights. 
  
2 
1.1 Research question 
Considering how – or even whether – to prioritize one right over another means 
getting involved in an argument of what matters most. In order to make clear why the 
allocation of relative importance to different rights is interesting, as well as a moral 
question deserving of normative analysis, I will in the following present some figures 
that point towards an intrinsic conflict between the two rights. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) thirty-four million people are 
infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or have acquired immune-
deficiency syndrome (AIDS) (WHO 2013a). Inhabitants of Sub-Saharan Africa 
accounts for less than ten per cent of the world’s total population, yet 66 per cent of 
all AIDS cases worldwide are found in this region (Saslow 1999: 577). 80 per cent of 
those in clinical need of antiretroviral medicines throughout the world cannot gain 
access to life-saving or life-extending medication (Greenbaum 2008: 142). An 
argument can be made that this is due to the extravagant cost of such medications.
1
 
On the word of James Crook (2005: 528), it is the rampant poverty in many of the 
world’s regions that is the foundation for the discussions on which of the two rights 
to give preference to when they come into conflict. With barely $8 a person to spend 
on health care and medical treatment per year in most sub-Saharan countries, the 
price tag of $10.000 for name-brand antiretroviral treatments against HIV/AIDS 
becomes insurmountable (Crook 2005: 528; Lauvset 2013). Patent control thus 
becomes a major obstacle to providing citizens with the medical treatments and the 
drug regiments they require in order to stay alive. The World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) has 
been heavily criticized for ensuring patent protection, whilst not doing anything, or at 
least not enough, to prevent life-saving drug treatments from becoming unattainable 
                                              
 
1
 This argument has been made by several researchers; see for example Crook 2005; Greenbaum 
2008, Joseph 2003, and Saslow 1999. 
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for the poor. Developing countries have long sought for development-oriented 
provisions in the WTO, and the TRIPS agreement in particular, but the organization 
and the agreement still leave much to be desired (Sell 2006: 147). The World Health 
Organization (WHO) is one of the platforms where these concerns are being voiced. 
The WHO was heavily involved in the Doha Development agenda in 2001, in 
working for amending the TRIPS agreement to incorporate measures that would 
protect and promote access to medical care (Greenbaum 2008: 148–150). 
The cost of medicines, and through it the right to health, is strongly linked to the right 
to intellectual property, through national- and international patent law ensuring and 
protecting ownership over intellectual property. What the figures of the last paragraph 
serve to illustrate, is the fact that the cost of medicine can, and often do, negatively 
influence the possibility for those of limited means to acquire medicines, and as such 
create problems with enforcing the human right to health. Patents create a drug 
market characterized by monopoly behavior; in that patent holders have the right to 
limit the production of similar products, and to some extent also decide the cost of the 
products their patents grant ownership over (Pogge 2011: 2). The right to intellectual 
property is due to this in direct conflict of interest with the right to health, with 
regards to the possibility of enforcement. 
This conflict of interest, between those in need of medicines and those who hold 
patents, is a source of great controversy. Not only in the case of access to HIV and 
AIDS medication on the African continent is this a vital, heavily debated issue. In 
most of the world’s nations – taking on different forms given the particular conditions 
of each instance – the access to medical care and medicine has been and is being 
deliberated. 
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Entries into this debate can (1) follow the lines of arguing for or against the rights 
themselves; (2) be regarding the merits of a universal health care plan
2
;(3) take on the 
form of an evaluation of international agreements’ effect on the supply of rights; or 
(4) constitute scientific case studies of particular instances of conflict.
3
  
There is thus a great deal of research to be found on the topic of health care – or 
lack thereof – in the developing-, as well as the developed world. This thesis will 
constitute a supplement to a widespread, important debate. Through looking at 
normative theories within political philosophy, in order to illuminate the issue 
further, this thesis sets out to make some claims as to what matters most. The 
research question of this thesis therefore becomes: 
 
Which of the two rights – to health and intellectual property – should be 
prioritized in situations where the two come into conflict with each other? 
 
In order to be able to make these assertions, the conflict between the right to health 
and intellectual property will be viewed through the normative theories of John 
Rawls, Robert Nozick and Henry Shue.
4
 It is these three contributions in political 
philosophy that will make up the theoretical framework and outset for my discussion.  
 
 
                                              
 
2
 One example here is the on-going debate in the United Stated of America, regarding The 
Affordable Care Act, or ‘ObamaCare’. For more information, see Yost 2014. 
3
 Examples of this last point are studies of the pharmaceutical industry and/or legal framework 
studies of intellectual property. See for example Bollyky 2013; Bombach 2001; Crook 2005; 
Greenbaum 2008; Risse 2008 and Saslow 1999. 
4
 For a further clarification and an overview of these theories, see chapter 4. 
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The research question can then be divided further into two specified enquiries:  
a) According to John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Henry Shue – which right 
should be given priority in instances of conflict? 
–and– 
b) Given the three theorists’ arguments for priority of one right over the 
other – which approach holds up best in a confrontation of arguments? 
It is necessary to emphasize here that even though focus in this thesis is put on the 
evaluation of theories and a confrontation of normative arguments, it is the 
implications and more general interest for society as a whole this discussion will lead 
to, that serves as motivation for the inquiry. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
In my thesis I will build towards an analysis of how to weigh the two rights against 
each other, and which to prioritize in a case of conflict, based on the normative 
prescriptions generated through the theories analyzed.  
Firstly, I will in chapter 2 present some reasons as to why this debate deserves 
attention. This chapter is necessary not only to place my thesis in a greater context 
within the field of political science, and specifically of political philosophy, but to 
show why the question is of further interest to society and to rights enforcement. 
Secondly, chapter 3 will briefly explain and define the rights to health and to 
intellectual property, so as to better be able to understand what specifically is being 
discussed within the confines of these pages. Chapter 3 will also further elaborate on 
the problems with regards to enforcing the two rights simultaneously. Continuing, 
chapter 4 will present the three separate theories that permeate throughout my 
analysis, so that I in chapter 5 am able to point back to topics and arguments 
discussed within the theories. 
  
6 
Chapter 5 constitutes the analysis portion of this thesis, divided into chapter 5.1 and 
5.2, to answer sub-points (a) and (b) of the research question respectively. The 
analysis will firstly shed light on the three theories and what they prescribe 
separately, as well as put the arguments up against each other. Finally, I will in 
chapter 6 present a summation of my findings, and draw my final conclusions. 
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2 Motivation for research 
This chapter presents the motivations for inquiring into the issue of which right to 
grant priority to in instances of conflict. The chapter is deemed necessary in order to 
explain why it the question is  of interest, and explain importance of this issue being 
understood as one of moral concern and normative significance. 
2.1 Conflict of interest 
First and foremost, the motivation for the research question of this thesis is the 
apparent conflict of interest between rights to intellectual property (or patent rights) 
and the right to health (or health care and medical treatment). 
Today, the tool used to protect and ensure rights to intellectual property on an 
international level is the World Trade Organization’s agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property. The WTO is an organization whose responsibility it 
is to facilitate and regulate international trade, and membership in the WTO 
prescribes amendments and alterations in national legislation, in order to comply with 
the regulations set forth in the TRIPS agreement. Part of the WTO’s work is related 
to protecting intellectual property rights. As worded by the World Trade 
Organization: 
The social purpose [of protecting intellectual property rights] is to provide 
protection for the results of investment in the development of new 
technology, thus giving the incentive and means to finance research and 
development activities. 
(WTO 2013a) 
In addition to protecting intellectual property rights, and thereby serving the 
(business) interests of medical technology developers and pharmaceutical companies, 
amendment measures have been taken to change the TRIPS agreement in order to 
ensure that public health in developing and least-developed nations does not suffer 
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unduly. This shows that there is an understanding of a duality to the question of 
supplying the right to intellectual property, based in the concern for what it entails for 
global public health. The makers and signatories of the TRIPS agreement so realized 
a need to protect intellectual property rights
5
, yet are also aware of the possible 
implications of this on the human right to health. This realization, of the possible 
complications arising from patent rights, in my opinion highlights the need for a 
discussion on which right to give priority to in situations of conflict. This discussion 
will be relevant for as long as the current treaty and agreement design is still being 
criticized for impeding work done in accordance with promoting global public health. 
2.2 Fundamental rights and global poverty 
Many human right scholars have argued that a human right to health should be 
understood as among the most basic of human rights and that it is worthy of going to 
great lengths to protect and ensure.
6
 If we accept this, as well as the premise that the 
supply of a right to intellectual property is negatively influencing the access to 
medical care, this will have grave consequences, and is worthy of scientific as well as 
societal debate. 
Another argument I believe underscore the need for research on the topic of how to 
prioritize rights, also drawn from the world of human right scholars, is relating to 
global poverty. Most can agree to the proposition that extreme poverty should be 
eradicated – as it produces great human suffering and every human being should be 
able to attain a minimum standard of well-being. Some will agree to this perhaps due 
to the effects of poverty on the global economy and others perhaps rather due to more 
humanitarian concerns. 
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 This need to protect patent rights is most often characterized by a reference to the necessity of 
securing profit from investment in research and development. 
6
 See for example Crook 2007: 534; Pogge 2007a and 2011; Shue 1996 and Toebes 1999. 
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Regardless of why one accepts the premise, low or no access to medical treatment is 
inseparably linked to poverty, on the individual level as well as on a societal level. 
An individual with a very low income would be incapable of spending large amounts 
of money on medical treatments, simply because he or she would not have the 
sufficient means to do so. On a societal basis, proper infrastructure in order to provide 
medical treatment needs to be in place in order to ensure the supply of health care. 
Developing or least-developed nations will have great difficulties both in supplying 
public health care benefits, educating medical professionals, as well as building 
clinics or hospitals, or investing in medical technology. In addition, nation states that 
have difficulty supplying their inhabitants with sufficient levels of medical care will 
have a population characterized by low life expectancy, high child mortality rates, as 
well as a large portion of the potential work force incapable of fully partaking in it. 
These are all factors that are detrimental to further development, and keep poverty 
levels high. Poor health as an economic problem thus seems to have a snow ball 
effect, where a state in lack of a healthy and therefore capable work force cannot 
efficiently build infrastructure or institutions that would help increase health levels. 
Such states would not have the resources necessary to committing to this undertaking, 
and the resources to build and develop become increasingly sparse at this ‘snowball’ 
continues to roll, and perhaps even pick up speed. 
Thomas Pogge argues that eradicating global poverty is an international responsibility 
rather than a strictly national one. If such is the case, then how we understand rights, 
and how we weigh them against each other, is of crucial importance to how we 
develop international agreements, and how we go about creating national as well as 
international law. Law can be said to be what ultimately regulates the supply and 
enforcement of all rights, as rights need a supplier – an addressee or a guarantor of 
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the right.
7
 Not comprehending the effects of intellectual property on the right to 
health, and through it the effect on global poverty, is disadvantageous when seeking 
to develop treaty and organizational design suitable to confront the issues at hand. 
In the book Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right – Who Owes What to the Very 
Poor?, Thomas Pogge argues that even though diverging economic growth rates in 
countries are linked to specific local factors, clearly global factors play a role as well 
(Pogge 2007b: 32). In Pogge’s own wording: 
The traffic of international […] economic transactions is profoundly shaped 
by an elaborate system of treaties and conventions about trade, investments, 
loans, patents, copyrights, trademarks, […] and much else. These different 
aspects of the present global institutional order realize highly specific 
design decisions within a vast space of alternative design possibilities. 
(Pogge 2007b: 32) 
Pogge presents the argument that even though local factors do matter a great deal 
when battling poverty, researchers are not sufficiently concerned with the effects of 
international treaties and conventions on poverty and poverty related injustice. Pogge 
also asserts that there is too little emphasis put on research developing alternate, and 
perhaps more effective, treaty designs to further the work of poverty eradication. 
Further, he claims in an international policy analysis brief for the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation, that: ‘avoidable health deficits result in avoidable suffering, lack of 
physical and mental functioning, as well as premature death on a massive scale. 
Because most of these medical conditions cause economic losses that are much larger 
than what it would have cost to avoid or adequately treat these conditions, realizing 
the human right to health would actually increase human economic prosperity 
                                              
 
7
 An addressee or a guarantor of a right, is the holder of the correlative duty or burden to enforce 
the right, meaning  provide the object of the right to the holder of the right (Lindholm 2013). This 
could, for example, be the state. 
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overall’ (Pogge 2011: i). It is here that a normative discussion of how to prioritize 
rights comes into play. Although this thesis will not concern itself with the 
eradication of poverty specifically, the understanding of consequences of choices 
made when prioritizing one right over the other needs be further and deeper than that 
of regarding it as making a decision about a single issue. Prioritizing intellectual 
property rights, situated in international agreements, over a right to health is not 
related only to cost and supply of medicines, profit margins for pharmaceutical 
companies, or free trade. It is also linked to levels of global poverty and to moral 
considerations. 
This thesis does not set out to discover if we are currently operating within a system 
design that optimally promotes and supports the goals we are trying to achieve. 
Rather, it will concern itself with the normative validity of different approaches with 
regards to how we prioritize. Goals are the realizations of interests; but are we 
working to promote the right interests? Answering this question might be considered 
an idealistic or even naïve undertaking, but the issue is nonetheless worthy of debate. 
It is my opinion that looking at the issue through the theoretical, normative 
frameworks, of John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Henry Shue, might bring us closer to 
an answer on what we should prioritize, and hence what matters most. 
 
 12 
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3 Justifying rights 
In order to conduct, and also understand, an analysis of which right to give priority to 
in instances of conflict, we need to first look at some possible definitions for the two 
rights. A moral code or normative theory can only with great difficulty and poor 
results be applied to a question of prioritization if we do not first define what it is we 
are weighing against each other. As the theories that are to be used are quite different, 
and the original intent for neither of the authors was to answer the specific research 
question of this thesis, I am presented with the necessity of defining the different 
elements that will be made use of within the confines of these pages. 
This will be done by firstly going through a distinction between human- and legal 
rights (chapter 3.1), before I move on to laying out some brief empirical proof that 
both the right to health and the right to intellectual property exist, and what they 
currently entail. The distinction between human- and legal rights will be made 
because I believe it is important that it is clear that they are not necessarily one and 
the same. 
The chapter constituting proof of the existence of the rights in question is deemed 
relevant, as prioritizing between two rights is nonsensical if one or neither exist in the 
first place. 
Chapter 3.2 will consist of a brief description of some of the problems that arise when 
seeking to ensure and supply both rights at the same time. Thus, I will be able to 
show the value of a normative discussion on which of the two rights to prioritize in 
instances of conflict, by relating it to a real life perspective of the present challenges. 
If the rights were not a source for debate or conflict, the discussion of which one to 
give preference to would not be a legitimate one. That is why this portion of the 
thesis is deemed necessary. 
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3.1 Difference between human rights and legal rights 
Margaret Macdonald writes that natural rights have an extensive history stretching 
from the Stoics and Roman jurists, to the Atlantic Charter and Roosevelt’s Four 
Freedoms. She also asserts that these rights are based on the idea that men are entitled 
to make certain claims, by virtue simply of their common humanity (Macdonald 
1946–1947: 225). 
As one can see from the year of publication for Macdonald’s contribution, she would 
not have been able to include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
when she referred to the stretch of this history of natural right as it did not yet exist.
8
 
However, the preamble of the UDHR states that the declaration is proclaimed based 
on the ‘[r]ecognition [that] the inherent dignity and […] the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world’ and that it is pledged by ‘[all Member States] to achieve, in co-
operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (UDHR: Preamble). This is 
very much in line with the tradition Macdonald refers to, and although the truth of the 
idea of natural rights is not a foregone conclusion, it is the foundation for much of the 
thinking on human rights. This thinking ‘[it] tends to be renewed in crisis of human 
affairs’ (Macdonald 1946-1947:225), and the lack of proper health care in many of 
the world’s regions would constitute such a crisis of human affairs. 
As stated by Tore Lindholm (2007: 398), a human right should ‘derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person’. If one believes that human dignity is 
something that is worthy of protection, then one needs also agree that there are some 
rights all humans (should) have, based solely on being human, in order to facilitate 
the protection of human dignity. This, as shown, finds support in the preamble of the 
                                              
 
8
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not adopted by the United Nations until 
December 10
th
 1948 (Glendon 2002: XV). 
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UDHR. Following from this is that a human right is morally justifiable if it protects 
and upholds human dignity (Lauvset 2013). The implication of the notion of human 
dignity is also that there is something inalienable about human rights, as their 
function is protect something inherent; something that does not disappear, and that is 
present in everyone. From this, it is evident that human rights, as opposed to legal 
rights, are not contingent upon existing laws enforcing them or a specific legal 
system, in order to be true. They are rights all human beings have, regardless of sex, 
race, religion, citizenship or other differences between individuals, even if legal 
systems are (not all) currently supplying, enforcing or guaranteeing the rights. 
The idea of human dignity and likewise human rights, as stated before, is neither an 
unescapable opinion nor one held by all. The presence of the very idea; of 
international declarations, and of governmental and non-governmental, national- and 
international organizations promoting human rights, still, however, allows us debate 
their comparative standing in relation to other rights. 
In summation, a human right is: i) a right originating from the idea that human 
dignity is worthy of protection; ii) a right that will facilitate the protection of human 
dignity; and iii) the right is true, meaning valid and applicable, for all human beings, 
regardless of the legal standing of the right in question in some places. 
Legal rights, on the other hand, are different from human rights, as they are 
dependent on a large array of varying factors. Most obvious here is the fact that 
different nations have different legal systems, and the rights supplied across nations 
therefore vary greatly. Legal rights are rights bestowed upon an individual by a 
specific legal system, and are thusly dependent on the structure and build of the 
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system, the location and legal standing of the individual
9
 – not the nature of the 
individual as a human being. 
The most striking difference between a human right and a legal right is that the 
human right is true, universal and inalienable, whilst the legal right is dependent on 
an individual human being’s location and standing within a legal system. Another 
prominent difference between the two is that only legal rights are truly enforceable. 
Therefore, whilst a human right is true for all human beings, it is not enforceable 
unless it is turned into a legal right. Interestingly, the right to intellectual property is a 
legal right – not a human right – which may in and of itself make it easier to enforce 
than the right to health 
3.2 The right to health 
In the following table 3.2.1 relevant articles from the UDHR and other conventions 
and declarations are presented, granting us with a foundation from where to start 
when discussing whether or not a human right to health exists, and what it entails. 
What becomes evident, when looking at the excerpts presented in table 3.2.1, is that 
there is widespread agreement on the importance of a right to life. All of the 
declarations or conventions contain mentions of this right, and to varying degrees the 
documents also put forth definitions as to which rights people have in terms of health- 
and medical care. This common conception so becomes an argument in favor of a 
human right to health. Albeit popularity on its own being a poor justification for a 
human right, it does count towards it (Lauvset 2013). 
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 The legal standing of an individual is important in relation to which legal rights are supplied to 
different persons within the same legal system. For example, a convicted felon, in many of the 
states of the US will have his or her right to vote removed – either for a period of time, or for the 
remainder of his or her life. ‘Most state constitutions still single out categories of people - [the] 
insane [and] felons - and deny voting to them. […]Many state laws forbid those convicted of 
felonies from ever voting in elections, even after they have left prison and have served whatever 
probationary period was required’ (Ingram et al. 2007: 98–99). 
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Table 3.2.1: Human Right to Health in International Declarations and Conventions 
Document Article(s) 
Universal 
Declaration 
on Human 
Rights 
Article 3: Everyone has the 
right to life, liberty and security 
of person. 
Article 25, part 1: Everyone has the 
right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being 
[…] including […] medical 
care and necessary social services, 
and the right to security in the event 
of […] sickness [and/or] disability. 
The American 
Convention 
on Human 
Rights 
Article 4, part 1: Every person 
has the right to have his life 
respected. […] No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life. 
Article 16, part 1: Every individual shall 
have the right to enjoy the best 
attainable state of physical and mental 
health. 
The African 
Charter on 
Human and 
Peoples 
Rights 
Article 16, part 2: States 
Parties to the present Charter 
shall take the necessary 
measures to protect the health 
of their people and to ensure 
that they receive medical 
attention when they are sick. 
 
The ASEAN 
Human Rights 
Declaration 
Article 11: Every person has 
an inherent right to life which 
shall be protected by law. 
 
Article 28, part d): Every 
person has the right to an 
adequate standard of living for 
himself or herself […] 
including […] the right to 
medical care and necessary 
social services. 
Article 29, part 1: Every person has the 
right to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical, 
mental and reproductive 
health, to basic and affordable health–
care services, and to have 
access to medical facilities. 
The European 
Social Charter 
Article 11: With a view to 
ensuring the effective exercise 
of the right to protection of 
health, the 
Contracting Parties undertake, 
[…] appropriate measures 
designed […]: to remove as far 
as possible the causes of ill-
health;[…] to prevent as far as 
possible epidemic, endemic 
and other diseases. 
 
Source: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The American Convention on Human 
Rights, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, The ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, The European Social Charter. 
 
 
  
18 
When it comes to justifying a specific human right, such as the right to health, James 
W. Nickel in Making Sense of Human Rights constructed a framework for how to go 
about this process. This framework can be used in order to distinguish between those 
rights that are to be considered human rights, and those that are not. Nickel presents 
six different criteria a human right must be able to meet and pass in order to be 
considered both applicable and universal. 
These are six criteria are: 1) Are the threats the right protect against substantial and 
recurrent?; 2) Is what the right protects against important?; 3) Can it be a universal 
right?; 4) Would some weaker norm be as effective?; 5) Are the burdens justifiable?; and 
6) Is it feasible in a majority of countries? (Nickel 2007:70–79). I will in the following 
view the right to health through this framework, in order to present some evidence as to 
the viability of the right to health as a human right. 
Viewing the right to health through Nickel’s framework for justification we can assert 
that point 1 through 3 is fulfilled.
10
 My argument here is a follows: A lack of protection 
for health is both a substantial and recurrent problem, cf. the arguments alluded to in 
chapter 2.2, regarding global poverty considerations and widespread debate on the 
matter, and a right to health is important because it would in all likelihood help ensure 
the right to life (referring to point 1 and 2 of Nickel’s framework). The right to health can 
be considered universal, as it has human beings as beneficiaries, has governments as its 
primary addressee, has high priority due to its benefit on the basic right to life, and can 
                                              
 
10
 The initial arguments of this paragraph, concerning point 1 through 3, is developed from a 
similar justification presented in my term paper from the class Human Rights, Ideologies and 
Political Regimes, titled ‘The Universal Human Rights to Intellectual Property and Health: Do 
They Exist and Can They Be Enforced Simultaneously?’, presented as an exam paper in the spring 
of 2013. The arguments have been expanded and altered, and the evaluation of point 4 through 6 is 
presented for the first time in this thesis. 
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apply around the world – as health is a question that makes sense in the context of any 
nation or time period, referring to point 3 (ibid: 75).
11
 
Regarding the fourth point, on deciding whether or not a weaker norm than a human 
right would be as effective, any answer would be no more than a highly uncertain 
assumption, given the comprehensive efforts required to build an infrastructure that 
provides health care and medical treatment to all. As can be seen, when delving into 
the subject matter, there is no consensus on how to, or even if one should, supply 
health care to all, cf. the debate on the Affordable Care Act in the United States of 
America.
12
 Considering this lack of agreement on the issue, it is difficult to imagine a 
comprehensive effort being taken, if the argument to do so was not grounded in a 
reliable and persuasive foundation. Katheryn Sikkink (2011)
13
 argues that human 
rights have seen an immense increase in importance, adherence and support over the 
last few decades. It is one of the normative theories, or moral codes, that is gaining 
considerable support the fastest, and most widespread. As evidence for this claim, she 
presents an increase in the prosecution of human right violators, and the prosecution 
of previous heads-of-state for such crimes; something that was until recently both 
unthinkable and unheard of. In addition, the creation of an International Criminal 
Court, the International Court of Justice, as well as the international tribunals of the 
former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda gives support to the argument that a concern for 
human rights is on the rise. Seeing as human rights as an idea is gaining reputability 
and support, linking the supply of health care to that, is a strategy that might prove 
useful. Not only that, but also in line with point 4 of Nickel’s framework, be the only 
type of norm system elaborate and well-respected enough to provide enough ballast to 
                                              
 
11
 The criteria listed here are James W. Nickel’s criteria for deciding whether or not a right can be 
considered a universal right, Nickel 2007: 75. 
12
 See footnote 2, located in chapter 1.1 Research question. 
13
 This is one of the main points made by Katheryn Sikkink in her book The Justice Cascade: How 
Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics. 
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ensure enforcement. It is therefore my careful conclusion that other norms, though they 
might suffice, would not be as efficient as linking a right to health to human rights. 
Point 5 of Nickel’s framework is relating to whether or not the burdens of instituting 
the right as a human right are justifiable or not. This criteria being fulfilled is 
dependent on how one distributes the costs of supplying all human beings with an 
enforceable version of the right, and what kind of benefit one is able to obtain 
through supplying the right. Several different ideas have been presented as to how to 
go about financing the endeavor of providing a global access to health care and thus a 
human right to health. An example here is Thomas Pogge’s idea of a ‘Health Impact 
Fund’ (HIF) (Pogge 2011). 
The HIF is a ‘pay-for-performance mechanism’, where patent holders or innovators 
register their medicines and undertake to make them available at no more than the 
lowest feasible cost of production and distribution. The innovators would also allow 
for generic production of registered medicines. As payment or incentive to enter into 
this fund, the innovators would be compensated with a sum dependent on the 
individual drug’s impact on global health. Pogge suggests an initial remuneration sum 
on the fund’s yearly budget of €4.5 billion – making the potential earnings for 
innovators registering their medications considerable. Another possible way of 
distributing costs, similar to that of Pogge’s Health Impact Fund, is presented by 
Jessica Greenbaum. Her proposed solution would be to create a WTO Remuneration 
Fund, where nations exporting medicines under the Paragraph 6 Waiver
14
 would not 
                                              
 
14
 In November of 2001 the WTO arranged a round on trade relations in Doha, Qatar, known as 
‘the Doha Round’ or the ‘Doha Development Agenda’ which led to the Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health. This was further specified in 2003 with the General Council 
Decision on TRIPS and Public Health, which constitutes the Paragraph 6 Waiver (Greenbaum 
2008: 148–150). It was adopted by the WTO General Council on 30 August 2003 (WHO 2013b). 
What the paragraph constitutes is a waiver of the export restriction in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
agreement (WTO 1994), allowing for the total amount of production done under compulsory 
licensing to be exported to other nations. Significant here is that when a country produces 
medicines under compulsory license, it is the responsibility of the ‘producing nation’ to provide 
remuneration to the pharmaceutical company that owns the patent – these costs are not a concern 
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have to pay remuneration to the pharmaceutical industry – but payment would instead 
come out of a joint WTO fund contributed to by all WTO member states. 
As whether or not point 5 of Nickel’s framework is fulfilled is dependent upon the 
allocation of costs and amount of (potential) benefit, I find it unwise to make a firm 
assertion on this point being fulfilled, when considering the justification of health as a 
human right. Suffice to say, by allocating the costs in a sustainable and (more) fair 
way, one would fulfil Nickel’s criteria. I believe Nickel did not sufficiently consider 
the problematic nature of how hypothetical the answer to this question would be, as it 
is impossible to decide if the costs are justified, without actually calculating and 
dividing up the costs, or even setting the wheels in motion. What these costs would 
amount to is incalculable without choosing a system of cost distribution, making the 
costs justifiable if they are divided correctly and not justifiable if divided incorrectly. 
Point 6 of Nickel’s framework suffers from the same kind of hypothetical question 
formulation as point 5. The feasibility of elevating health to the status of a human 
right is dependent on how it is done, and who will take on the costs. Pogge’s Health 
Impact Fund and Greenbaum’s WTO Remuneration Fund could potentially go a long 
way in making it feasible in a majority of nations. Whether or not the burdens are 
justifiable or if it is feasible to enforce such a right depend not only on who would 
take on the burdens, but also on a joint conception of what a human right to health 
should entail. To make any assertions on the reach and limitations of such a right is 
very difficult. But, one could make the argument that it at the very least should be a 
right providing access to health care and medical/pharmaceutical treatment in order to 
prevent life-threatening disease and injury, both of which could potentially be 
achieved through Pogge or Greenbaum’s alternative cost distribution schemes. 
                                                                                                                                           
 
for the importing country. It is these cost Jessica Greenbaum suggests moving from the exporting 
country, to the WTO Remuneration Fund. 
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From this discussion, I will conclude that a right to health can be considered a human 
right, as it does pass through Nickel’s six criteria, even if not unscathed. The human 
right to health will for the remainder of this thesis be thought of as a right to medical 
treatment for life-threatening disease and injury, as well as access to preventive 
health and medical care. 
3.3 The right to intellectual property
15
 
The question of whether or not there are rights to intellectual property is one that has 
a clear, resounding answer. Intellectual property rights have been prevalent in both 
domestic and international law for over 500 years, beginning with the first recorded 
patent law in Venice, Italy from 1474 (Drahos 1998:3). Most international 
declarations and conventions regarding human rights also contain within them 
mentions of property rights, as well as rights to intellectual property. It is noteworthy 
that the documents from the regions Africa, the Americas and Asia have specified, 
more so to than the UDHR and the European counter-part The European Convention 
on Human Rights, that intellectual property should be thought of as both personal 
property, as well as in the sense of being a public good. In table 3.3.1 I have 
presented an overview of excerpts from some of these international rights 
declarations, in order to show the presence of an international acknowledgement of 
(intellectual) property rights. 
The existence of intellectual property rights may, for reason displayed above, not be a topic 
of much debate. However, what is a topic of continuous controversy is what intellectual 
property rights entail and how they are to be defined, who the beneficiaries are, and how 
the rights are to be enforced. It is not my contention to try and prove intellectual 
  
                                              
 
15
 This chapter, similarly to chapter 3.2, contains some building blocks first assembled in 
constructing the arguments for my term paper in the class Human Rights, Ideologies and Political 
Regimes (see footnote 10).  However, it has been expanded and altered since. 
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Table 3.3.1 The Right to (Intellectual) Property in International Declarations 
Document Article(s) 
The Universal 
Declaration of 
Human Rights 
Article 17, part 1: Everyone has the right to 
own property alone as well as in 
association with others. 
Article 27, part 2: Everyone 
has the right to the 
protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary 
or artistic production of 
which he is the author. 
The African 
Charter on 
Human and 
Peoples' 
Rights 
Article 14: The right to property shall be 
guaranteed. It may only be encroached 
upon in the interest of public need or in the 
general interest of the community and in 
accordance with the provisions of 
appropriate laws. 
 
The American 
Convention on 
Human Rights 
Article 21, part 1: Everyone has the right to 
the use and enjoyment of his property. The 
law may subordinate such use and 
enjoyment to the interest of society. 
Article 21, part 2: No one 
shall be deprived of his 
property except upon 
payment of just 
compensation, for reasons 
of public utility or social 
interest, and in the cases 
and according to the forms 
established by law. 
ASEAN 
Human Rights 
Declaration 
Article 17: Every person has the right to 
own, use, dispose of and give that 
person’s lawfully acquired possessions 
alone or in association with others. No 
person shall be arbitrarily deprived of such 
property. 
Article 32: Every person has 
the right, individually or in 
association with others, to 
freely take part in […] the 
benefits of scientific 
progress and its 
applications and to benefit 
from the protection of the 
moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, 
literary or appropriate 
artistic production of which 
one is the author. 
The European 
Convention on 
Human Rights, 
Protocol 1 
Article 1: Every natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. The 
preceding provisions shall not, however, in 
any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary 
to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties. 
 
Source: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The African Charter of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, The American Convention on Human Rights, the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration, The European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol 1. 
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property rights as a human right. Having the right to intellectual property pass 
through Nickel’s framework of justification would fail already at the third point. A 
right to intellectual property does not fulfil the fourth point either, as it is not 
considered a human right today, and ‘weaker norms’ (meaning laws) are already 
protecting the right quite effectively and efficiently, through for example the 
agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property in the WTO. 
A right to intellectual property will within the confines of this thesis be understood as 
the (legal) right to obtain monetary or some other kind of (material) compensation 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production (UDHR, Article 17), with 
special emphasis on the scientific – as that is the portion that is the most relevant in 
relation to health care and medical treatment (Lauvset 2013). Intellectual property 
rights will thus be defined as the claim right to being remunerated for work efforts 
and ideas, resulting in a product. 
3.4 Barriers to ensuring both rights simultaneously
16
 
I have earlier gone through the difference between human rights and legal rights. To 
reiterate those points, a human right is inalienable and true for all human beings 
regardless of their legal standing and relationship to a legal system; whilst a legal 
right is dependent on a legal system providing the right. These two types of rights can 
exist parallel to each other, without being in conflict, and many times legal rights lay 
out in practical terms what human rights state, such as the right to vote, the right to 
free assembly, the right to free speech, or right to freedom of religion, within many  
nation’s legal systems. The problem of a conflict of interest does not arise until one 
                                              
 
16
 Chapter 3.4 contains some of the same findings, formulations and conclusions as my exam paper 
for the class ‘Human Rights, Ideologies and Political Regimes’ in the spring of 2013, titled ‘The 
Universal Human Rights to Intellectual Property and Health: Do They Exist and Can They Be 
Enforced Simultaneously?’. 
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tries to enforce different rights at the same time that are contradictory to each other, 
or where the promotion of one right might lead to the breaking of another. 
According to Tore Lindholm (2013) for a right to be enforceable it needs to have an 
addressee in charge of supplying the right. In the case of both the human right to 
health and the legal right to intellectual property this addressee would be the state 
through its legal system. A state signatory to one or more of the declarations 
mentioned earlier, and a member of the WTO and signatory to TRIPS, becomes 
addressee of the two rights, and so has the duty to uphold them both at the same time. 
This means that a state needs to take into consideration the legal framework 
regulation both access to health– and medical services, and patent laws regulating 
intellectual property rights, when deciding how to go create a legal system that grants 
and protects both of the rights for its population (Lauvset 2013). 
In order to supply its inhabitants with a health care system that covers everyone to the 
minimal extent of preventing death, given how I previously defined the human right to 
health for the purposes of this thesis, it is not unthinkable that infringing on the right to 
intellectual property or some of the articles in the TRIPS agreement might seem an 
optional course of action for a nation attempting to improve access to health care. 
One example that can serve to illustrate this is the Indian Supreme Court decision of 
April 2013, to not issue a patent in India in the case of the cancer drug Gleevec. 
India’s highest court rejected a request for patenting the drug Gleevec (Bollyky 2013) 
and thus allowing for the production of generic drugs using the same content 
fabrication as the original manufacturer Gleevec. These generic versions could then 
in turn be provided to India’s largely poor population at a fraction of the cost of the 
name-brand pharmaceutical. It is debatable why this decision was made, depending 
on which laws and regulations in the Indian legal system one interprets and 
emphasizes. Politically, however, one possible reason is that this could have been 
done in order to promote access to health care and medical treatment, and thus the 
human right to health in India. At the same time it is argued, not surprisingly, by for 
instance the owners of Gleevec, that it is in violation of the TRIPS agreement, to 
  
26 
which India is a signatory (Bollyky 2013). This could be one among many other 
efforts taken by the Indian state in order to provide its population with a more 
affordable health care system, state-of-the-art medical treatments and a human right 
to health. 
Another example can be gained by looking at Emily Saslow’s contribution to the 
debate from 1999, discussing the then current situation in terms of AIDS medication 
availability in South Africa, focusing on the nation’s use of compulsory licensing.17 
South Africa passed legislation in 1997 ‘[i]n response to the plague-like proportions 
of the HIV and AIDS epidemic […] to provide for measures for the supply of more 
affordable medicines in certain circumstances’ (Bombach 2001: 273). The legislation 
was signed into law by recently deceased Nelson Mandela, then president of South 
Africa, in December of the same year (Saslow 1999: 578). The amended law would 
permit both compulsory licensing and parallel importation
18
 to be approved by the 
Minister of Health (ibid). The amendment was known as article 15(C) of the South 
African Medicines Act (SAMA). It opened up for prescribing conditions in which 
                                              
 
17
 Article 30 of the TRIPS agreement states that: ‘Members may provide limited exceptions to the 
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties’ (WTO 1994). It is 
this article that opens up for compulsory licensing. This means that a nation can set aside the patent 
on a product without requiring the consent of the patent holder (WTO 2013b), so that the product 
is not considered patented, in the traditional way of understanding it, within the nation in question. 
One or more companies are then allowed to make use of the ‘recipe’ for the medication and 
produce generic versions of it. This will in turn remove the some of the justification of charging 
high prices for the product, as there is lesser or no need in cases such cases to fund a research and 
development department. Manufacturing may also be done at a lower cost, given for example the 
differences in wages between countries. 
18
 Parallel importation is in Saslow (1999: 578) referred to as ‘international bargain shopping’. 
What it means, in practical terms, is for a government to investigate the price of any given drug in 
countries around the world, and then import it from the country where the price is the lowest, 
instead of buying medications directly from pharmaceutical companies. This is a course of action 
that could significantly reduce the costs of medicines. For example, the two antiretroviral 
medicines acyclovir and neverapine cost twice as much in Kenya and 35 per cent more in Tanzania 
than they do in Norway – a ‘price differential that equates to 500 hour’s worth of work for a 
Tanzanian worker compared to an hour’s worth of wages for a Norwegian’ (Crook 2005: 24). 
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access to more affordable medicines would be ensured by not extending patent rights 
to medication that could help ensure public health (ibid). The South African Minister 
of Health would under this amendment have the right to decide that medications with 
the same treatment capabilities and make-up as a medication falling under the 
description of ‘being able to protect public health’ could be imported (ibid). This 
could potentially open up for importation of generic drugs – or so-called grey 
importation.
19
 
At the time as Saslow published her research, the legislation described above had 
been both passed and signed into law, yet had not yet taken effect due to disputes 
over patent law and international trade obligations both nationally and internationally 
(ibid: 579). This dispute was due to the vast amount of possibilities for interpretation 
of the TRIPS agreement, when it came to national legislation on patent protection 
(ibid). Depending on the interpretation of the agreement, South Africa could both be 
considered perfectly within the boundaries of what the agreement allowed for; or, the 
new legislation could be considered unlawful. According to Saslow, the dispute lies 
in how far-reaching intellectual property right protection should be under 
international law, cf. the controversy stated in the beginning of this subchapter. 
What is especially interesting about Saslow’s research for this thesis is the reaction of 
the pharmaceutical industry both in South Africa, Europe and the US after the 15(C) 
amendment to the SAMA, and what it shows about the difficulty for a state, as the 
addressee of a right, of providing both rights at the same time. 
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 Grey importation can only happen in conjunction with compulsory licensing. When a nation 
decides to produce or allow for production of generic medications. these drugs, before the 
Paragraph 6 Waiver, had to be distributed within the borders of the nation where production took 
place. However, under the Paragraph 6 Waiver grey importation is allowed. The export restriction 
was removed for countries fulfilling a certain set of criteria, so that in contrast to the agreement as 
it stood before, developing nations could import generic drugs manufactured in other nations under 
compulsory licensing. This means that the cost of medicine and drugs with the same treatment 
capabilities as name-brand antiretroviral treatments could potentially be significantly reduced, and 
in turn become available to a large group of people who previously did not have access due to lack 
of resources. 
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The pharmaceutical industry in the United States, represented by the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), interprets the TRIPS agreement 
to be protective of intellectual property and patent rights, as this would ensure 
continued profits for the industry. The reaction of the pharmaceutical industry in 
South Africa, the US, and Europe to the 15(C) amendment was to launch a legal 
challenge to it in the South African Constitutional Court, as they stood to lose income 
in South Africa first, and then in the rest of the world. PhRMA stated that: 
[T]he recent posture of the South African government makes it clear that 
South Africa intends to pursue a policy of weakening essential protection 
for patented pharmaceutical products […]. From recent remarks and 
actions, the apparent intent of the government of South Africa is not only to 
defend its diminishment of the effectiveness of patent protection in South 
Africa, but to urge other countries to similarly weaken patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products. 
(Saslow 1999: 580) 
Notably, the Office of the United States Trade Representative also put South Africa 
on a Special 301 Watch List due to their (alleged) lack of compliance with the TRIPS 
agreement. This, in the strictest for of understanding, does not in and of itself 
constitute actual trade sanctions, but ‘being on the list [is] considered a trade 
sanction, because the US government is advertising [that] the country [is] an 
investment risk’ (Saslow 1999: 581). 
Jessica Greenbaum (2008) argues that competing interests between patent holders and 
developing countries is the main obstacle to providing accessible health care for all. 
The interesting point she brings forth is that current amendments to the TRIPS 
agreement, constructed to facilitate better access to medical care, are not being made 
use of by nations. According to Greenbaum the only developing nation that had, by 
the end of 2008, made use of the Paragraph 6 Waiver, was Rwanda. She points out, 
perhaps legitimately so, that this suggests the waiver and other alleviating alteration 
efforts to TRIPS,  had not achieved their desired results (ibid: 143–144). One of the 
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arguments Greenbaum makes regarding the importance of the P6W is that it opened 
up for grey importation. Before the inclusion of the P6W, grey importation was 
technically allowed – as nations could import generic drugs manufactured in other 
nations. However, to export generic drugs was illegal under the TRIPS agreement as 
it stood (ibid: 145). This is an example where the (unintended) effects of one law or 
agreement phrasing becomes nullifying on the potential gain of something that is not 
illegal. A similar example could be the logic of the Norwegian criminalization of 
purchasing sexual favors. To buy is illegal, whilst to sell is not
20
. This means that even 
though prostitution is legal, the transaction as a whole is not – much like the dilemma 
of grey importation before the Paragraph 6 Waiver. Greenbaum suggests that the 
reluctance to make use of this amendment, is based on lingering tensions and the belief 
that sanctions could be imposed on countries that make use of the amendment, 
regardless of the legality (Greenbaum 2008: 149–150; Shadlen 2004: 90).  In addition, 
there are no official guidelines for how to implement legislation that allows for 
compulsory licensing, or how to become an import or export country whilst still 
being in line with the TRIPS agreement. Neither are potential export countries 
incentivized to become actual export countries, as they are the ones left paying 
remuneration costs and could because of it (possibly) be left without any financial 
winnings from producing or exporting medication. All of these arguments point 
towards a difficulty of promoting and ensuring a human right to health, originating 
from difficulties in doing so whilst complying with the legal framework governing 
intellectual property rights. 
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 Whilst the Norwegian criminalization of purchasing sexual favors could serve as an example of a 
similar kind of logic, it is important to note that the legality/illegality distribution of buying and 
selling is reverse to that of grey importation. Before the Paragraph 6 Waiver it was illegal to sell 
generic medicines, not to buy them. 
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The problems of ensuring both rights at the same time thereby become: 
1. The state is the addressee and supplier of both rights, and may have to 
prioritize one right over the other. 
2. There are enormous differences in the availability of – and access to – 
health and medical treatment due to differences in material wealth between 
nations. 
3. Interests of intellectual property right holders and the interests of those 
requiring medical treatment are (polar) opposites in terms of cost. 
4. Even when amendments are made to agreements governing intellectual 
property rights, in order to facilitate the promotion of a human right to 
health care, these are not being used, due to: 
i. Fear of sanctions 
ii. No existing guidelines for implementation of legislation 
incorporating and promoting both rights 
iii. Lack of incentives to become export countries, as these have to 
pay remuneration costs under the current regime 
(Lauvset 2013, Greenbaum 2008) 
With these difficulties of simultaneous enforcement in mind, I move on to the 
theoretical chapter of this thesis. 
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4 Theory 
Chapter 4 of this thesis will outline and give a summation of the theories from the 
political philosophers John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Henry Shue. This will be done 
in order to better be able to make use of the varying philosophical directions and 
arguments in the analysis immediately following this chapter. The summation will 
limit itself to those points that shall be useful in the further discussion, yet not be 
completely exhaustive in relation to my use of points made and lines quoted from the 
respective political philosophers. 
The overview of the three theories will as such constitute a description of the main 
ideas and views presented by the different scholars, and thus the theoretical 
framework for the further discussion. 
4.1 Rawls: Fair and equal rights 
According to Martha Nussbaum, ‘John Rawls […] is the most distinguished moral 
and political philosopher of our age’ (Nussbaum 2001:1). His ideas as to what makes 
a society just and how justice is connected to an individual’s pursuit of the good life, 
inspired an era in political philosophy and political thinking with a greater focus on 
justice, respect and liberty (ibid.: 2). 
What Nussbaum means when mentioning this ‘inspiration’ originating from Rawls is 
first and foremost his work A Theory of Justice published in 1971
21
, but also The Law 
of Peoples from 1993 and The Idea of Public Reason Revisited from 1999. In A 
Theory of Justice Rawls provides us with an alternative to what he calls ‘standard 
utilitarianism’ and his political philosophy joins the ranks of other contractarian 
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 The version of A Theory of Justice I make use of in this thesis was printed in 1973, and so the 
references bear this year, rather than 1971 – the original year of publication. 
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theories.
22
 Social contract theory, the dominant theory of justice in the western 
tradition, views principles of justice as the result of a contract people make, for 
mutual advantage, in order to leave the state of nature and govern themselves through 
different versions of a legal system (Nussbaum 2004: 4). 
A Theory of Justice and the governing ideas it outlines originates behind what John 
Rawls refers to as the veil of ignorance. This is an abstract concept, where from 
behind the imagined veil, information is hidden from human beings. John Rawls 
refers to this state as the original position, and puts forth that a state of hidden 
information is the preferred way of interpreting and making use of an original 
position (Rawls 1973: 18–19). The original position ‘is the appropriate initial status 
quo which insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair’ (Rawls 
1973: 17). By information being hidden, it is imagined that behind the veil of 
ignorance, no man or woman knows anything about his or her own relative standing 
in society as a whole. He knows not whether he is rich or poor, if he is healthy or ill, 
powerful or powerless. It is under these limitations of knowledge and information 
constraints that John Rawls presents his theory of which governing principles rational 
individuals would choose. 
Rawls expects people to choose or discover a set of principles to govern societies, 
based on the notion that they know nothing of their relative standing to each other. 
Rawls makes use of this veil of ignorance, in order to prove to the reader that there 
are certain rights, rules and principles we would all, as rational beings, agree to as the 
                                              
 
22
 ‘Contractarian theories’ refer to different versions of social contract theory, as described briefly 
in the passage above. These are theories regarding the organization of societies, where the 
members enter into a social contract defining the norms, rules and laws to abide- and live by. They 
do not (necessarily) constitute real life contracts, but rather symbolize the concept of members of a 
society agreeing to a way of arranging social interaction, and how to let themselves be governed. 
Other examples of social contract theorists are John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and David Gauthier. For more on social contract theory or its proponents see entry in the 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/> [last 
accessed 20 May 2014]. 
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best foundation, if we were not tainted by self interest based on our own social and 
economic standing in a specific (type of) society. This would remove the chance of 
people agreeing to principles that would be rational to choose only ‘if one knew 
certain things that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice’ (Rawls 1973: 18, my 
own emphasize). Rawls wants to make clear that ‘one conception of justice is more 
reasonable than another, or justifiable with respect to it, if rational persons in the 
initial situation would choose its principles over those of the other […]’ (Rawls 1973: 
17). By eliminating people’s possibilities or incentives to choose rights and duties 
that would benefit them due to their position in the system, Rawls believes we are to 
come closer to a truly just system. Without information that could let decisions be 
governed by self interest, rational beings will choose principles that are to everyone’s 
best interest, and that are just – and so will constitute a more reasonable conception of 
justice. 
The principles that originate from this thought experiment behind a veil of ignorance 
are in the opinion of Rawls the liberty principle and the difference principle. These 
two principles state that ‘First: each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others’. (Rawls 1973: 60), 
and that ‘Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open for all.’ (ibid.) 
The first point indicates that all that are bound by the social contract will have the 
same rights, to the same extent, and that no one’s rights will be of such a nature that 
to make use of them would prohibit or hinder someone else from using their rights. 
The second point, which is divided into two sub points, entails that inequalities are to 
be distributed in such a way that they are to the best possible result for those that will 
have the worst outcome of those bound by the social contract, and that the offices and 
positions that govern the society should be open to all. 
When Rawls moves on to discuss the implications of these principles on international 
relations, he does so in The Law of Peoples.
 
Here, Rawls applies a similar set of 
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restrictions to different peoples’ knowledge about their relative standing to each 
other, and suggests which governing principles and foundations for international 
agreements and the relations between peoples can be accepted, in a truly just 
community or society of peoples
23
. Rawls is in this publication only concerned with 
(liberal) democracies, or decent states
24
 - and not those states that are not governed 
through principles not in line with democracy and fundamental freedoms. He calls 
this Society of Peoples a ‘realistic utopia’. By realistic utopia, John Rawls is referring 
to that his work depicts ‘an achievable social world that combines political right and 
justice for all liberal and decent peoples […]. (Rawls 1999: 6). The Society of 
Peoples would be governed by the following principles of justice: 
1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are 
to be respected by other peoples 
2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings 
3) Peoples are equal and are parties to agreements that bind them 
4) Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention 
5) Peoples have the right to self-defense, but no right to instigate war for 
reasons other than self-defense 
6) Peoples are to honor human rights 
7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war 
8) Peoples have duties to assist other peoples living under unfavorable 
conditions that prevent their having a just of decent political and social 
regime 
(Rawls 1999: 37) 
                                              
 
23
 Rawls talks of a Society of Peoples, rather than a society of states. He does so because he in his 
work is referring to the different peoples as actors, and not states. Just as citizens are the actors in 
domestic societies, liberal democratic peoples and decent peoples are the actors in the Society of 
Peoples (Rawls 1999: 23). 
24
 By the wording of ‘decent states’, Rawls is referring to states that are non-liberal, but whose 
basic institutions meet certain specified conditions for political rights and justice, such as the right 
for people to play a substantial role in the governing of themselves and to make political decisions, 
for example through participation in associations and groups (Rawls 1999: 3). 
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This list, though incomplete according to its author, describes how the relations 
between different peoples should be in Rawls’s ‘realistic utopia’. 
In The Law of Peoples John Rawls also states that injustice and the great evils of 
history do not come from discrepancies in the level of resources between nations, but 
from some societies lacking justice – in shape of just institutions. Political injustice, 
he states, has been the cause of ‘war and oppression, religious prosecution and the 
denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, genocide and mass murder’ 
(Rawls 1999: 6–7). 
4.2 Nozick: Property rights 
Robert Nozick’s publication Anarchy, State and Utopia, published in 1974, debates 
the legitimacy of a government with regards to its reach and involvement in the 
individual person’s life. According to Nozick, the minimal state, whose only 
responsibility and power it is to protect people’s right to govern their own lives, 
preserve their liberty, and ensure people can protect their own property, is a just state. 
No other form of state, or amount of centralized power could be considered 
legitimate. Nozick refers to this type of state as the (minimal) night-watchman state 
(Nozick 1974: 26). Nozick clearly writes out (1974: 149) that: ‘the minimal state is 
the most extensive state that can be justified. Any more extensive state violates 
people’s rights.’ 
Nozick draws a picture in order to present his theory, where individuals exist in a 
state of nature, in much of the same way as Rawls’s starting point is also a state of 
nature. In Nozick’s state of nature, individuals are free and can make use of their 
property in which ever way they find best. They can do so only if they at the same 
time agree to respect the interests and rights of others, meaning that their use of their 
property does not prohibit, or take away, others’ possibility to use theirs. But, at this 
point conflict will arise in Nozick’s state of nature (Nozick 1974: 10–12). Some 
individuals will behave in ways that will limit other people’s opportunity to be free 
and do as they wish. Because of this, people will form alliances where their collective 
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action allows them to enforce their rights (Nozick 1974: 12–15). And thus, through 
collective action and agreements on how to behave and how rights and duties are to 
be enforced, states come to be. Nozick believes that this way for a state to emerge 
will not infringe on any individual’s freedom, and the result is consequently just. 
In terms of property rights, Nozick is a strong proponent of these. He believes that the 
right to property, and the duty of the state to protect property from being arbitrarily 
taken away from individuals, is absolutely fundamental to a just state. A just state 
would only arise if the intention was for it to, among other things, protect people’s 
property and protect against theft – and if the state does not do so, it is by no means 
just. Nozick also argues that any state that seizes or takes away an individual’s 
property, either by taxing earnings or taking hold of the property in question, without 
obtaining the person’s consent, unjust (Nozick 1974: 149). The state is in this 
instance unjust, even if the property was taken away, or the tax was demanded, in 
order to achieve distributive justice among all individuals. 
Further, property can according to Nozick be obtained in two ways. He calls the 
righteous obtainment of property the principle of justice in acquisition. An individual 
can obtain property by having the ‘original acquisition of holdings’, understood as 
becoming the owner of something that is not previously owned by anyone, or he or 
she can have property transferred from someone that used to own it, for example 
through inheritance or a sale (Nozick 1974: 150). Significantly, any new distribution 
that arises from Nozick’s three principles of transference holdings, is just. These 
principles are: 
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
acquisition is entitled to that holding 
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
transfer, from some one else entitled to the holding, is entitled to that holding 
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2. 
(Nozick 1974: 151) 
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The relative distribution of wealth is just if it is brought about through voluntary 
action by individuals in a free and open market. This means that Nozick views all 
forms of redistributive efforts by a government to be unjust, and a breach of the 
individual’s right to self-government and personal property. 
4.3 Shue: Basic rights 
The work by Henry Shue that will figure in this thesis is Basic Rights: 
Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy. Here, Shue takes the stand saying 
that major international human rights documents often artificially divide different 
(kinds of) rights into categories, such as  ‘civil and political rights’ and ‘economic, 
social and cultural rights’, and that this division leads to an understanding that one 
set is more important than the other, based on within which document they are 
placed. Different documents are ratified by different countries and at different 
times, making this designation of relative importance even easier to believe, even 
though the ratification process is, if not usually then at least often, based on other 
concerns – such as economical considerations, or feasibility of enforcement. As an 
example, he points to the two International Covenants: The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights – covenants of rights that originate out of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Shue 1996: 8). Shue is opposed to this division, and 
rather believes it to be illegitimate. According to Shue, focus on the fulfilment and 
enforcement of rights across the globe, and their relative need for priority, should not 
be on one arbitrarily defined set of rights, but rather on what he calls a fundamental 
core of rights. 
This core of basic rights would contain subsistence rights, rights to liberty and rights to 
security (Shue 1996: 5–9). Subsistence rights, as Shue defines them, fall under the 
category of what is more commonly known as economic rights. The declaration of all 
economic, social and cultural rights, no matter how vital their fulfillment is, as less 
genuine rights, with less binding duties, Shue states is ‘intellectual bankruptcy’(ibid.: 6). 
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Moving on, Shue writes about the definition of a right, and how it is the foundation to 
make (legitimate) claims or present a justified demand in relation to others. His 
definition looks as follows: ‘[A] right provides (1) the rational basis for a justified 
demand (2) that the actual enjoyment of a substance be (3) socially guaranteed 
against standard threats.’ (ibid.: 13). Here, Shue explains that a justified demand is a 
demand all people with the right have against others, yet he does not define which 
others he is referring to. Most likely, the lack of a specific definition of these ‘others’ 
is due to the varying instances in which people can claim to have rights – be it in 
relation to a government, in relation to other individuals, or as human beings in the 
international community. When Shue seeks to define a right in a more literary poetic 
sense, he draws upon a quote by American legal scholar and political philosopher 
Joel Feinberg: 
[R]ights are not mere gifts or favors, motivated by love or pity, for which 
gratitude is the sole fitting response. A right is something that can be 
demanded or insisted upon without embarrassment or shame. When that to 
which one has a right to is not forthcoming, the appropriate reaction is 
indignation; when it is duly given there is no reason for gratitude, since it is 
simply one’s own or one’s due that on received. 
(Joel Feinberg, quoted in Shue 1996: 15) 
Shue believes this to be true of at least basic moral rights, and that a right providing a 
rational basis for a justified demand to enjoy something more than the right in and of 
itself, to be the most neglected element of rights: More specifically, a right is not a 
right to enjoy the right in question, but a right to enjoy something else – like food or 
liberty (Shue 1996: 15). 
More precisely, when Shue speaks of basic rights, he means rights that no self-
respecting person can reasonably be expected to relinquish, because the absence 
thereof is tantamount to accepting the removal of all rights. This means that a basic 
right is a right upon which all other rights depend – rights without which individuals 
are not able to enjoy any other rights (ibid.: 19). With regards to what he defines as 
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basic subsistence rights, these are unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate (amount 
and quality) of food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter, and minimal preventive 
public health care. These are enjoyments needed in order to ensure a decent chance of 
a reasonably healthy and active life of more or less normal length (Shue 1996: 23), 
and constitute the minimum we should be able to accept and expect. 
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5 Analysis 
In this part of my thesis, I will analyze what the theories of John Rawls, Robert 
Nozick and Henry Shue imply for the rights to intellectual property and to health, 
with regards to which of rights should have priority over the other in instances of 
conflict. I will also in this chapter put the arguments up against each other, and draw 
some conclusions about which arguments best holds up throughout. 
5.1 On rights to intellectual property and health 
5.1.1 Rawls 
To not take Rawls’s intentions too far, I believe it to be necessary to state that the 
author wrote that his ‘[…] principles primarily apply […] to the basic structure of 
society. They are to govern the assignment of rights and duties to regulate the 
distribution of social and economic advantages’. Rawls did not set out to create a 
comprehensive list of which rights and duties should be granted and not, or in detail 
describe how these rights and duties should be upheld. There is, obviously, no instance 
in which he states that intellectual property rights should be prioritized over a right to 
health, or vice versa. What he does assert however, is that the first principle of justice 
mandates that any set of rights agreed upon must be equal for all, in order to be 
considered just. Also, he makes a point out of proclaiming that ‘while the distribution 
of wealth and income need not be equal, is must be to everyone’s advantage’ (Rawls 
1973: 61). I will come back to these two points in the following paragraphs. 
As explained in chapter 4.1, under the veil of ignorance rational beings would reach 
two fundamental principles for the governing of society: The difference principle and 
the liberty principle. To reiterate, these are: ‘First: each person is to have an equal 
right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others’. 
(Rawls 1973: 60), and ‘Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open for all.’ (ibid.) 
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Let me first look at the principle of equal rights for all, and how this principle is 
brought about in Rawls’s theory on justice. Imagining people under a veil of 
ignorance is a strange concept that requires a bit of an imaginative leap. It is not easy 
to imagine beings that do not know their interests. Neither is it easy to imagine beings 
that can be fully rational, without knowing anything about their circumstances. We 
are taught that rational choice requires the consideration of interests, in order to be 
defined as such. Max Weber presents four versions of rational action – based on 
interests originating in either desired outcomes, values, emotions or tradition (Grimen 
2007: 206–209). In order to accept Rawls’s veil of ignorance, we therefore have to 
suppose that the actors behind this veil have at least a limited knowledge of what they 
are interested in. For example, the actors must know that pain and injustice is bad, as 
well as that pleasure and justice is good, and that they prefer the latter over the 
former. The veil of ignorance is perhaps not necessarily the best ‘location’ from 
where to reach answers and conclusions about conflicts of interest that present 
themselves in the real world – like the one I seek to answer in this thesis. 
None the less, if we accept the premise of a veil of ignorance, and imagine one where 
all information about relative standing in a society is hidden, Rawls’s conclusions 
seem sound if we grant the actors the minimal amount of knowledge put forth in the 
previous paragraph. Rational beings are not such gamblers that they would agree to a 
system where only a very few would have rights and liberties, whilst the rest had 
none, out of fear that they might turn out to be in the group of individuals that are left 
without. 
Looking at this first principle that the actors would necessarily have to come to, that 
each person is entitled to the most extensive basic liberty, it tells us that people can be 
considered entitled to all kinds of rights, as long as they do not interfere with the 
rights of others. A right to health care as well as a right to intellectual property are 
thus both generally supported by this principle – as long as they do not interfere with 
each other in a negative way. If they interfere with each other, by default they will 
also result in one person’s utilization of his or her rights being to the detriment of 
another person’s utilization of his or her rights. If I make use of my right to 
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intellectual property that could negatively interfere with your right to health care or 
medical treatment – if I am the patent owner of the drug that you require. As was 
presented in chapter 3.4, in the real world – these rights do at times come into conflict 
with each other. Rawls therefore provides us with support for both rights in theory, 
but not necessarily in practice. 
If we on the other hand imagine a veil of ignorance, similar to that of Rawls’s, where 
information was hidden and rational beings were presented with the choice between a 
right to access to medical care or to rights of intellectual property, rational beings 
would choose a right to medical care. 
Let me present this argument comprehensively, in a way where the potential threats 
to rational actors are more visible. Under this veil of ignorance, a rational actor would 
not know his or her standing in society. He or she would not know is he or she would 
be capable of inventing something that would need to be protected by intellectual 
property rights, and he or she would not know if he or she would be in need of 
medical care – or even what the access to medical care would be like. The actors 
would, however, know that they have a fundamental interest in avoiding suffering, 
and in staying alive. If one is threatened with either the possibility of having a disease 
and not being able to receive treatment, or missing out on earnings from a patent – 
the rational being would choose what constitutes a defense against the most serious 
threat – the alternative that presents the lesser gamble. The most serious threat in this 
case would be to not have access to medical care, as this could result in severe pain or 
death. Loosing out on earnings from something one invented would not be enjoyable, 
it could be considered exceedingly unfair, but one would in all likelihood not die. It 
can therefore be concluded that even though Rawls’s theory of justice does not 
preclude the existence of a right to health and to intellectual property simultaneously, 
by using the same approach of a veil of ignorance – I find that rational beings would 
choose a right to health over a right to intellectual property, thereby making a right to 
health just, and what should be prioritized in Rawls’s framework. 
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If we instead of using the veil of ignorance to determine this, but rather just let 
Rawls’s state of nature stand on its own and define the principles of how we are to 
assign rights, we can suppose a type of society where both rights exist, like in the 
actual world. Moving, then, to another point in Rawls’s publication, we might come 
to a different conclusion on which right his theory prescribes the prioritization of. 
Rawls states that: 
These principles are to be arranged in a serial order with the first principle 
prior to the second. This ordering means that a departure from the 
institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified 
by, or compensated for, by greater social or economic advantages. 
(Rawls 1973: 61) 
What can be alluded from this statement, is that Rawls puts greater stress and 
importance on a system of rights being equal, than he does on the legitimacy of 
efforts that would ensure the economic and social advancement of parts of the 
population. I find that it is here important to note that the rights Rawls refers to as 
having to be equal, are more traditional, liberal rights – and not social or economic 
rights, as the right to health could be considered. I still, however, believe that due to 
his emphasize on rights having to be equal in order to be just, his theories support a 
right to health over a right to intellectual property. I have before concluded that 
Rawls would give priority to a right to health, if this was in conflict with a right to 
health, based on which right rational beings would choose behind a veil of ignorance. 
What this quote serves to prove is that Rawls would support a right to health, if equal 
to all, even if another right would (potentially) better the relative comfort and 
enjoyment of some. 
As mentioned in chapter 4.1, Rawls in The Law of Peoples states that injustice and 
the great evils of history do not come from discrepancies in the level of resources 
between nations. They originate rather in some societies lacking justice – in the shape 
of just institutions, or a just political system. Political injustice, he states, has been the 
cause of ‘war and oppression, religious prosecution and the denial of liberty of 
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conscience, starvation and poverty, genocide and mass murder’ (Rawls 1999: 6–7). If 
we suppose that Rawls is correct in his assertion that poverty is caused by the lack of 
a just society, the conflict of interest between a right to health and to intellectual 
property takes on another form. If the access to medical care, as stated by Pogge
25
, is 
so heavily interlinked with and dependent upon poverty levels – an assertion that 
seems quite plausible, then the conflict of interest would not necessarily be avoided 
by assigning higher importance to the right to health. Rather, we should prioritize the 
eradication of poverty through those means that are the most effective with regards to 
improving everyone’s standing, across the board. As mentioned in the beginning of 
this sub chapter, it is of great importance to Rawls that the distribution of wealth and 
income is to the betterment of all, even if it is not equal. If the problem of low access 
to medical care is not originating from, or very emphasized, by the presence of a right 
to intellectual property, but rather from and by an unjust system, the right to 
intellectual property can not be considered to be the problem. However, if the right to 
intellectual property is creating great discrepancies in the level of wealth that are not 
rooted in an effort to increase the level of enjoyment for all – but rather the few – it 
cannot be supported by the framework presented in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. 
5.1.2 Nozick 
In the case of Robert Nozick’s work, I believe it is needed to firstly assert that whilst 
Nozick is very much concerned with property rights, he does not specifically discuss 
intellectual property rights. I will make no claims as to the reasons for why he does 
not discuss them, but rather use his framework in order to try and discover what the it 
would entail for intellectual property rights. 
Firstly, intellectual property rights are different from rights to other kinds of property, 
due to the very special concept they grant holding rights to. Intellectual property 
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 See chapter 2.2, on basic rights and global poverty. 
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rights are rights that ensure compensation to the inventor of something new, when 
this something is used by someone else. It is so the access to the potential earnings 
that arise from the utilization of an idea or a piece of work, that intellectual property 
rights protect. Hence, intellectual property rights are granted to researchers that 
publish a book, a musician that produces an album, the director of a movie, as well as 
to engineers that create tools, or a pharmaceutical company that develops a new kind 
of medicine. The notion that one may own an idea can to some seem strange, as an 
idea cannot be touched or felt, and when it is transferred, the original holder loses 
nothing of it. An idea or a thought can freely be shared by many, without that having 
any impact on the amount of the idea. Ideas are such perhaps the least finite 
‘possession’ or resource imaginable. 
However, if one is to create something and the idea for this ‘something’ is not 
protected, it is possible for anyone to make use of it – and the original inventor stands 
to gain nothing from the discovery or even from production. His or her work will 
have been of no personal gain. Intellectual property rights therefore, I believe, lay 
somewhere in between the realm of regular property rights, and the right to be 
compensated for ones work. 
In his chapter on distributive justice, Nozick writes that: 
There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all 
the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out. What each 
person gets, he gets from others who give him in exchange for 
something, or as a gift. In a free society, diverse persons control different 
resources, and new holdings arise out of the voluntary exchanges and 
actions of persons. 
(Nozick 1974: 149–150) 
Here, I would like to focus on how Nozick refers to new holdings coming into 
existence. Intellectual property can be defined as such a new holding – because it 
came to be through the actions of persons. Even though ideas are not something 
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physical or real in the strictest sense of the word, they do need to be thought of or 
discovered in order to exist. Unlike physical objects, whose existence can be said to 
be definite and irrefutable, regardless of someone knowing about them or not, an idea 
does not exist until someone comes up with it. 
Much like farmland is mere land until it is worked and such yields fruits, inventions 
do not exist before someone puts the work into making them. The fruits of a farm 
only exist because someone put the work into making it so, and medical inventions 
are only made because people put countless hours of work, as well as immense 
financial resources into research and development, to actually discover and create 
them. We would have no objection to a farmer claiming he owned the fruits produced 
on his farm, yet it does to many not come as natural to assert that a researcher owns 
the ‘fruits of his mind’ – be it a book, an machine or a new drug against hay-fever. 
There are countless of actions that we believe people are entitled to be compensated 
for, even though the actions do not constitute the transference of property from one 
holder to another. The entire notion of a service industry is based on the concept that 
the work, or the time someone spends doing a task, is worthy of (monetary) 
compensation. In order for someone to repair your car or give you legal advice, you 
need to compensate them. Yet in many instances, they have not given you a single 
piece of physical matter that you could be said to be paying for. The reason I believe 
intellectual property rights lies somewhere in between regular property rights and 
rights to compensation for ones work, is this: For the mechanic to fix your car, he or 
she need not only do the actual task – but also needs to devote time to learning the 
specific skill set in order to know how to perform the task, as well as figure out what 
is wrong with your car. Whilst fixing the car is just an action, learning how to repair a 
vehicle is a mental process. A mental process I am unable, or perhaps only unwilling 
to perform, but that I am willing to pay someone else to carry out; a compensation for 
work that I believe the mechanic is justly entitled to. Likewise with the lawyer: He or 
she spent years studying the law, in order to be able to tell me how I should behave to 
best preserve my interests. These are services that I appreciate dearly, and that I need 
– and so I am willing to pay for them. When a researcher, or a company, lays down 
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efforts to create a drug – they do so not only because it might have a value on its own 
to create something new, or because it has value on its own to learn. They do it also, 
and perhaps mostly, in order to make money. 
Nozick refers to what is presented in the previous paragraphs as a traditional socialist 
view of entitlement to holdings (1974: 154). This view constitutes the idea that 
whoever creates a holding is entitled to it. Nozick states that the view that workers are 
entitled to the product and full fruits of their labor, because they have earned it, is 
something he agrees with, and that a distribution is unjust if it does not present the 
workers with what they are entitled to. He agrees with this because it is true to the 
notion that earning and producing a holding makes you entitled to it – referring to the 
principle of original acquisition of holdings. He believes it greatly implausible that 
who created the holding should have no impact on who should hold it (Nozick 1974: 
155). The alternative to this entitlement to holdings, or entitlement principle, is a 
patterned principle for the distribution of holdings (Nozick 155–164). Here, a 
government would continuously break into individual’s lives, or the market, in order 
to ensure that the relative distribution of holdings stayed the same as which ever 
initial distribution was deemed proper and just. This, Nozick believes, greatly 
undermines not only free will, and the right to self-government, but also basic liberty, 
because actions are throughout governed by some other entity; an entity or a state that 
cannot be considered just in Nozick’s view. 
Further, Nozick looks at the traditional statement of ‘to each according to his______’, 
and tries to fill in the blank with something that fits with his theoretical approach. He 
concludes that the most accurate version would be: 
From each according to what he chooses to do, to each according to what he 
makes for himself (perhaps with the contracted aid of others) and what 
others choose to do for him and choose to give him of what they’ve been 
given previously (under the maxim) and haven’t yet expended or 
transferred. 
(Nozick 1974: 160) 
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Realizing that this might be a bit of a mouthful, he shortens his conclusion to: ‘From 
each as they choose, to each as they are chosen’ (ibid). 
Because an idea is a product that it is possible to rehash and reuse indefinitely once it 
is known, there is no way to ensure that people are compensated for their intellectual 
work other than by creating a system where these ideas are thought of as physical 
things that one can claim ownership over. If not, the idea could simply be used by 
someone else, in order to create the exact same product. Intellectual property rights 
are rights to be compensated for ones work, based in the notion that ideas are things: 
things that should not be taken, in the same way that we believe it is wrong to take 
someone’s bicycle, their wallet or other possessions. 
Moving back a bit, I wrote in chapter 4.2 that in Nozick’s view, one can become the 
holder of property in two ways. An individual can obtain property by having the 
‘original acquisition of holdings’ – becoming the owner of something that is not 
previously owned by anyone, or – he or she can have property transferred from 
someone that used to own it, for example through inheritance or a sale (Nozick 1974: 
150). Gaining intellectual property could then fall under both these categories of how 
to obtain a holding. If one comes up with an idea that is new, this idea can not be said 
to previously have been owned by anyone – and one has original acquisition of 
holding. There are also workings in place in (some) legal systems where one can buy 
a patent, or where the copyright of a book will fall to the inheritors of an author when 
the author passes away. This means that intellectual property rights are to some extent 
supported by Nozick’s theory in this aspect too, as well as in order to be compensated 
for work, even though the does not discuss them specifically. 
Having concluded that intellectual property is supported by Nozick, I want to shift to 
looking at what his views are on property and redistribution thereof. Like mentioned 
in chapter 4.2, Nozick believes both taxation and other forms of redistribution, that 
are not voluntary, to be unjust. The most important assertion Nozick makes regarding 
this, in relation to my thesis, is that all state-enforced redistribution, is morally unjust. 
It is unjust, because it violates people’s right to freedom and property, and the state 
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takes on a role and a reach further than that of a state Nozick would classify as just 
and legitimate.  
The entirety of Nozick’s strong defense of property rights rests on an idea of an initial 
just distribution of holdings. If this initial distribution could be considered fair and 
just, whatever alterations brought about by human action later on, as long as these 
transactions were also fair and just, the distribution at any given time is to be 
considered just. This is an idea that finds support in Rawls’s Law of Peoples.26 The 
great problem here is that, even if we would agree with this notion, Nozick cannot 
point to a place in time where this initial distribution was made, or state that is this 
initial distribution was just for that matter. There has never been an initial or ideal 
distribution of assets, from which we could start at a level playing field. Therefore, 
there is no outset for the measurement of all further transactions, to decide if these are 
just. Individual transactions across the board could theoretically have been in line 
with Nozick’s prescription, but without a just initial distribution, we are still left with 
an unjust result. 
Given historical circumstances, referring only to a very few examples such as the 
colonization of Asia, Africa and much of the Americas by Europeans, as well as the 
slave trade that ran for close to 400 years, we can with fair certainty conclude that 
even if there had been a previous stage at which all resources were distributed justly, 
we are far from in a situation in which we can say that today’s distribution is just. 
Given that property, by Nozick’s standards, therefore cannot be considered to be 
fairly distributed, how could we justify a system where rights are granted to hold 
claim over patents for drugs that could potentially help those people that are worst off 
under this unjust distribution – people who might in fact be at the worst end of the 
scale, specifically due to these past injustices? The patent rights acquired by some 
                                              
 
26
 See pp. 113–119 in Rawls 1999, on distributive justice. 
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may also be a result of this past injustice, to that they are not truly entitled to them 
either. 
The free market that Nozick holds up as the ultimate just arbitrator for transactions of 
holdings is not devoid of history. Neither are international agreements that affect or 
promote the free market. The TRIPS agreement, under the WTO, defined the playing 
field and wrote the rule book, so to speak, for how patent rights are to be interpreted 
for all members to the organization and signatories to the agreement. As referenced in 
the initial chapters, there have been made alterations and special clauses in the 
agreement to prevent that patent rights are allowed to run rampant and inflict grueling 
restrictions on access to medical care, specifically in developing nations. 
But, as could be seen by the example of the South African Medicines Act, even when 
nations try to make use of these special clauses, because they see a dire need to do so, 
the initiative is shot down by other powerful actors in the field. This shows that whilst 
the transactions in the free market might be just and in line with Nozick’s theories, 
the rules that are applied to the (free) market through international agreements are not 
in line with what is deemed necessary in terms of prioritization in individual nations. 
This is further exacerbated by the very real economical and financial need to be a 
member of the WTO and the TRIPS agreement for many nations. It is a clear cut 
instance of ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ politics. It is important to note 
that this is not necessarily problematic within the confines of Nozick’s theory. It is, 
however, not a point in his favor that nations are by need required to partake in 
agreements that restrict their liberty, and dole out obligations for action that are not in 
line with their true interests. This seems a very real obstruction of the right to liberty. 
5.1.3 Shue 
As stated in chapter 4.3, Shue is a advocate for so-called basic rights. He believes 
some rights take precedence over others, regardless of which document they are in, or 
what is being said by state officials on which rights should be prioritized. This 
argument is a moral one – seeing as it puts emphasis on the element of human dignity 
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as something valuable that needs to be protected. But, it is also a practical argument 
in the distinction between different (kinds of) rights. 
Some rights are basic because they are what all other rights depend upon. The 
practicality argued above lies in assuring a foundation to stand on, when doling out 
other rights and duties. Without certain rights at the bottom so to speak, it is ill-
advised to create a further framework or list of other rights, as there needs to be a 
guarantee of a bare minimum available to all in order for other rights to count for 
anything. 
Taking these points into the debate of this thesis, it becomes clear that Shue would 
support the prioritization of a right to health over a right to intellectual property. 
Without access to health care or medical treatment, it is highly likely that people will 
die. In fact, this is supported by daily occurrences all over the world. Once you are 
dead, however – and perhaps stating the obvious, you have very little need of 
intellectual property rights. Shue does not object to intellectual property rights, but 
simply states that they is not of the utmost importance. 
However, Shue is not clear in how far he believes the reach of a right to health should 
be. As seen in chapter 4.3, Shue supports a subsistence right to ‘preventive public 
health care’ as a minimum. He states that not every child in need will be 
(automatically) entitled to open-heart surgery, but also that a ‘diet that produces a life 
expectancy of 35 years of fever-laden, parasite-ridden listlessness’ is not sufficient to 
count as proper subsistence (Shue 1996: 23). So, the justified claim to health care will 
have to, following Shue’s line of argument, lay somewhere in between these two 
extremes. It is not unreasonable to assume that access to both vaccines that prevent 
illness, and drugs against already contracted diseases, might constitute this ‘in 
between’. 
Further, Shue argues that a right is the rational basis for justified claim to actual 
enjoyment of the right in question. A right to health would constitute the justified 
claim to medical treatment, even in the minimal understanding of the right as 
preventive health care. It is a fact that in some cases, there is no such thing as 
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preventive health care without drug treatment. Diseases such as tuberculosis and 
polio still in most regions of the world require vaccines in order to be protected 
against. And in the case of babies born having already contracted HIV from their 
mothers, would not antiretroviral (ARV) treatment count as preventive health care? 
There are also medications that if taken by an expecting mother prevents HIV from 
being transferred to the child. Does that not count as preventive health care? 
A right to intellectual property would constitute the justified claim to legal protection 
of and access to (potential) gain from any invention patented. These two are, as seen 
in chapter 3.4, currently at odds with each other. Because they are at odds with each 
other, and because of Shue’s notion of basic rights, a right to health needs to be 
prioritized. 
5.2 The arguments confronted 
I have in the previous chapters looked at which rights the three theories prescribe 
priority to in instances of conflict, and reached the conclusion that whilst both Rawls’s 
and Shue’s theories support the prioritization of a right to health over a right to 
intellectual property, Nozick’s theory leans towards rather prescribing priority to a right 
to intellectual property. In the case of Nozick, this holds true if the right to intellectual 
property is defined as part property right, part right to compensation for work. 
Looking then at which argument we should lend our ear to, when deciding which 
right should matter most, there are some considerations that need to be made. 
Firstly, I will focus on the objections to prioritizing a right to intellectual property 
over a right to health that have been brought up earlier in this thesis. A right to 
intellectual property would not (necessarily) fit with a set of rights available and 
equal to all, cf. Rawls. Neither would it be compatible with Shue’s contention that 
basic rights deserve preference. Shue’s assertion that we need a foundation of rights 
in order to ensure life – health being one of these foundational rights – counts 
towards the prioritization thereof if one accepts this premise. Also, when looking 
back to the framework for justifying rights by James Nickel, presented in chapter 3.2 
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and 3.3, the right to intellectual property does not to the same extent measure up 
throughout the framework for justifying rights. Let me for a moment here consider a 
quote from Martha Nussbaum: 
Any theory of justice that proposes political principles defining basic 
human entitlement ought to be able to confront [the] inequalities and the 
challenges they pose […] 
(Nussbaum 2004: 3–4) 
This stresses, and I believe rightly so, that any theory of justice worthy of its name 
must be capable of answering the question of how we are to handle immense 
inequalities between people(s). This I interpret to mean not only being capable of 
answering how to confront inequalities on a theoretical level, but answering how 
human entitlement interests are to be ensured across the board. 
Robert Nozick might be right about several of his claims, and as a moral theorist his 
logic is sound. It is not easy to find faults with his reasoning that any holding you 
have legally obtained cannot be taken away from you arbitrarily. It is also difficult to 
poke holes in the argument that intellectual property constitutes legally obtained 
holdings – especially if defined as part property, part entitlement to the fruits of one’s 
labor. But in order to be deemed relevant for society and as a convincing theory of 
justice, I believe arguments need to be applicable to real life problems and answer the 
concerns raised in specific situations – if these situations are reoccurring and 
important. The concern raised throughout these pages is that intellectual property 
rights prevent the supply of the right to health. This instance of concern is very much 
reoccurring across both time and space, as well as important – as a right to health is a 
right there is considerable interest in having fulfilled. Nozick’s argument for property 
rights is a strong one, but would employing his moral theory make us capable of 
ensuring these interests? If it is our interest to mitigate suffering – as an increased 
focus on human right over the last decades without question shows it is – is 
protecting property rights at all cost the way to go? 
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In Nozick’s view, individuals have a long list of rights that limit the reach of public 
policy and redistribution attempts. These rights, or ‘side constraints’ as he labels 
them, entail that no person should have to sacrifice his or her position or belongings, 
to ensure the betterment of others (Malnes and Midgaard 2007: 246). It can be argued 
that Nozick would not be concerned with a right to health in the least. As long as 
people were entitled to the property they had, and they got to keep it, he would have 
no objections to the state of things. There would continue to be great inequalities, that 
would to many seem unfair. 
This does not make Nozick wrong. Disagreement does not mean that one side is right 
and one is wrong. Neither does it mean that either side are right or wrong.  
Nozick disagreeing with Shue and Rawls simply means that Nozick is not of the 
opinion that redistribution is something those who govern should concern themselves 
with. In fact, Nozick’s theory constitutes an objection to the trend of the time – the 
idea that there is such a thing as a common good that is achievable through 
redistribution of property, or a moral balancing act (ibid.; Nozick 1974: 33). Limiting 
patent control or intellectual property rights would be such a moral balancing act. A 
failing to be in line with the popular opinion, is in and of itself not enough to deem 
Nozick neither irrelevant nor wrong. If his attempt is to prove that the current 
thinking on rights has gone too far towards the consideration of a common good, I 
cannot fault him for not falling in line with others. 
However, if Nozick’s argument is not applicable to real life – in terms of deciding is 
the distribution of holdings is just or not, problems arise. Nozick claims that property 
rights constitute absolute constraints against a government’s intervention with 
individuals’ property (Malnes and Midgaard 2007: 247). Yet, according to Malnes 
and Midgaard (2007: 247–248), this view is somewhat modified by Nozick’s 
realization that a complete review of transactions since the dawn of time is 
impossible. Thus, presenting a guarantee that the current distribution is just, 
according to Nozick’s own principles of transference, is also impossible His emphasis 
on the free market as an arbitrator of conflict with regards to interest might be correct 
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and even morally sound. But, given that there is no just starting ground from where to 
start measuring if transactions are just or not, something his argument so heavily 
relies upon, it can perhaps not be taken as an argument convincing enough to claim 
that the current distribution is just, or that redistribution is not called for. In order to, 
perhaps, weigh up for this lack, Nozick states that: 
[O]ne cannot use the analysis and theory presented [in ‘Anarchy, State and 
Utopia’] to condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it 
is clear that no considerations of rectification of injustice could apply to 
justify them. Although to introduce socialism as the punishment for our sins 
would be to go too far, past injustices might be so great as to make 
necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them. 
(Nozick 1974: 231) 
Through this excerpt it becomes evident that whilst Nozick would strongly object to a 
state meddling in an individual’s private affairs and with his or her property rights on 
a general basis, he does open up for it in special instances where it would be in an 
attempt to rectify grave, past injustice. This means that in the case of intellectual 
property vs. health, Nozick could be said to agree with the idea that a right to health 
is deserving of priority – if it serves to remedy effects of past injustice, and is short-
whiled. 
Importantly, as the regions of the world most affected by lack of proper medical care 
and extreme poverty are also the regions that have been the most unjustly treated 
throughout history  – it is not a wild assumption that these regions are, according to 
Nozick’s historical theory of justice, deserving of ‘special treatment’(Malnes and 
Midgaard 2007: 248). This special treatment could entail a more extensive state than 
that which Nozick would originally accept, and a scheme of transfer payments. This 
means that whilst Nozick fundamentally disagrees with Shue and Rawls, all three 
theories could potentially lead to the same result. A result where emphasize and 
priority is granted to a right to health, based on either:  
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 Rawls: It being a right everyone is equally entitled to. 
 Shue: It being a basic right needed to ensure all other rights. 
 Nozick: It being a measure required in order to make up for past injustice that 
has resulted in someone: 
o i) having more than they should have, by having acquired intellectual 
property rights they would not have had if the injustice had not 
happened 
o ii) having less than they should have, because past injustice had led 
them to not have access to health care or medical treatment they would 
otherwise have had. 
So, whichever theory we lend our ear to, we could end up with the same result in this 
specific conflict of interest. Though, it is important to note here that Nozick’s theory 
of justice would only allow for this to go on short-whiled, and until the past injustice 
revealed could be considered outweighed. 
As all the three theories could potentially lead to the same result of giving priority to 
a right to health (at least for a while), there is one argument I would like to take a 
brief look at here – an argument that permeates throughout the debates on the conflict 
between these two rights. 
An estimated cost for the development of a new drug or medication is upwards of 
$350 million before the medicine hits market (Herper 2013); by any standard a vast 
amount of money. This cost is also independent on whether or not the drug ever 
reaches the market. What this means is that even when intellectual property rights are 
in place, there is no guarantee that an effort to develop a new medicine would ever 
pay off – either financially or in the form of a useable drug. In fact, close to 95 per 
cent of treatments never make it past the development stage, and much less onto the 
market (ibid). With this as the operational reality for pharmaceutical companies, 
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compounding further reasons not to develop new drugs, by removing or limiting the 
reach of intellectual property rights, could potentially result in a ‘quick drop and a 
sudden stop’ 27  for the pharmaceutical industry’s incentives to develop new 
medications. Without intellectual property rights, there is a chance that incentives to 
develop new drugs would disappear or be diminished below a critical point. Much 
like in the case of the mechanic or the lawyer mentioned in chapter 4.2, if I would not 
be willing to pay them for their services, they would (most likely) not provide them. 
Drugs are produced because they are needed; and because there is money to be made 
from doing so. We cannot reasonably expect people to work for free. Not only does 
this go against our core rationality, it is also in breach of our human right to not be 
victims of slavery. To claim that pharmaceutical companies and their employees 
would be working in slavery if intellectual property rights were lowered, is hyperbole 
and not worthy of much consideration. Yet, the concern that the removal of 
intellectual property rights may result in an increase in the development of drugs that 
are cheap to research, manufacture and that sell well, rather than the drugs that are 
needed the most, is not ridiculous. Removing intellectual property rights from the 
equation could potentially have worse implications for global health, than having 
them in place has proved to have. To be able to cure diseases, we need drug 
development, and perhaps we need strong intellectual property rights for this to 
happen. 
What this serves to illustrate, is that even if one were to agree with Shue and Rawls; 
even if one considered Nozick’s priority of property rights over equal rights or basic 
rights as defined by Shue and Rawls ludicrous – abandoning intellectual property 
rights in order to ensure a right to health, might be ‘shooting oneself in the foot’. This 
is why alternate schemes of remuneration for pharmaceutical companies in trade for a 
lowering of intellectual property rights and restrictions is such an interesting field. 
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 A ‘quick drop and a sudden stop’ refers specifically to death by hanging, but is here used in the sense of an 
end to all. 
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Here, no rights would be removed and the need to prioritize would disappear – 
instead there would be an alternate system in place to ensure that the two rights were 
fulfilled. As was presented in chapter 3, there are alternatives already presented, for 
example the Health Impact Fund of Thomas Pogge, or the WTO Remuneration Fund 
of Jessica Greenbaum. These alternate approaches have not (yet) been tested. There is 
thus no way for me to assert with confidence whether one of these systems would be 
better or worse than the situation today. But what is for certain is that such a scheme 
would be in line with all three theories. It would protect a right to health, without 
diminishing intellectual property rights – if the costs within this system design were 
put on those who had acquired more than their fair share of holdings through 
historical injustice. 
Whilst popular opinion with regards to this question nowadays may be more in line 
with Rawls, and especially with Shue, through studying Nozick’s arguments one 
cannot help but agree that there is much to be said for the protection of property 
rights. If not necessarily on their own, then at least as another and important weapon 
in the fight for the betterment of global health. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
Jamie Crook (2005: 534) quotes Alicia Ely Yamin when he writes that ‘[a] broad 
interpretation of the right to life [should] include access to life–saving medication if 
withholding such treatment would otherwise deprive life’. This statement is very much in 
line with Henry Shue’s argument for the prioritization of basic rights and his emphasize 
on their importance with regards to ensuring life and subsistence. At the same time, 
Shue’s argument it is also in line with the recent currents in rights thinking, with notions 
such as Responsibility to Protect, Duties Beyond Borders and international courts being 
on the rise. There seems to be a growing appreciation for and adherence to human rights, 
and human rights being understood in a different way from that of traditional, liberal 
rights. Not only within single nations can this increase in emphasize be seen, but also 
through international undertakings to ensure human rights worldwide. This could come 
from a spark in agreement on the idea that we are all equal, all in possession of human 
dignity, and deserving of equal rights. This again is very much consistent with Rawl’s 
theory of justice and equal rights. 
I have in the past chapters reached some conclusions as to what the three theories suggest 
we give preference to, in the debate of what matters most. I have found that Henry Shue 
and John Rawls lean in the direction of a human right to health being worthy of 
precedence, whilst Robert Nozick’s framework supports the upholding of a right to 
intellectual property. Nozick does, however, open up for redistribution attempts, if they 
are made use of in order to rectify past injustice and are short-whiled. Further, I have 
concluded that whilst proving either of the theories analyzed wrong was not something I 
was able to do, they all under certain conditions pull in the direction of the human right 
to health being of higher priority than the right to intellectual property. 
Further, the right to intellectual property is tied to the right to health in more ways than 
one. It is not solely a hinder to the efforts regarding the betterment of global health. 
Intellectual property rights are also perhaps dearly needed, in order to ensure further 
research and development of medications and medical technology. This leads me to the 
conclusion that whilst the normative approaches to the question of priority analyzed in 
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this thesis points towards a right to health, it might not be fruitful without also ensuring a 
right to intellectual property. What is of the utmost importance is how we execute this 
right, so that it does not work against a right to health – but rather supports it and 
increases its reach. When a right to intellectual property is deemed necessary, as I believe 
it is, we need concern ourselves with how to ensure and enforce it, without jeopardizing 
other rights. The question should not necessarily be if intellectual property rights are 
legitimate as they compromise efforts to ensure global health. Rather the conversation 
should concern itself with how to continue financing of research and development, 
without having those in the most dire need, and those who have the least due to past 
injustices, be responsible for footing the bill. The Health Impact Fund and the World 
Trade Organization Remuneration Fund are optional design schemes that might alleviate 
the conflict of interest between holders of intellectual property rights and those in need of 
medical care. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights consists of articles setting out to ensure the 
bare minimum of right we should be satisfied with, in order to ensure human dignity. 
The right to life’s central placement suggests great importance, a notion that finds 
support worldwide. Without ensuring a right to life, I believe there is a logical 
dissonance in debating which other rights to ensure, or how to prioritize between 
different rights. A right to health care and medical treatment will go a long way in 
furthering the right to life. Perhaps would a right to intellectual property do the same, if it 
was understood, enforced and ensured in the right way? The right way would be one that 
ensured a just system of rights for all – both those in need of medical care, and those 
deserving of intellectual property rights. Ultimately, that is what matters most. 
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